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This paper examines investments made by 13 angel groups across 21 countries. We 
compare applicants just above and below the funding cut-off and find that these angel 
investors have a positive impact on the growth, performance, and survival of firms as 
well as their follow-on fundraising. The positive impact of angel financing is 
independent of the level of venture activity and entrepreneur friendliness in the country.  
But we find that the development stage and maturity of start ups that apply for angel 
funding (and those that are ultimately funded) is inversely correlated with the 
entrepreneurship friendliness of the country, which may reflect self-censoring by very 
early stage firms who do not expect to receive funding in these environments. 
  
                                                        
1 Lerner and Schoar are also affiliates of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
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the University of Texas, and especially Shai Bernstein, Thomas Hellmann, Arthur 
Korteweg, and Ramana Nanda provided helpful comments. We thank the Harvard 
Business School’s Division of Research and the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation 
for financial support. All errors and omissions are our own.    
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1. Introduction 
The last decade has seen a rapid expansion and deepening of the types of 
vehicles that fund start-up firms in the U.S. and worldwide. In particular, we have seen 
a growing role of angel groups and other more “individualistic” funding options for 
start-ups, such as super angels or crowd sourcing platforms.  This trend has not only 
been prevalent in the U.S., but also in many other nations (OECD, 2011; Wilson, 2105; 
OECD 2016). One could argue that the funding of new ventures by wealthy individuals 
is one of the oldest forms of outside investment that exists, especially where capital 
markets and financial institutions are less developed. In this paper, however, we focus 
on the organized angel market as a growing form of start-up investing that is less 
formal than the VC market but more professional than getting funding from friends 
and family. 
 
The precise measurement of the total size of the angel investment market, is 
difficult due to the fact that most angel investments are made on an individual basis, 
and thus typically are not subject to regulatory disclosure requirements. But 
estimates suggest that the total size of angel investment has long surpassed venture 
capital investment in the U.S. and increasingly in some other countries as well. For 
instance, survey estimates suggest the projected size of the total angel market in the 
U.S. grew from $17.6B in 2009 to $24.1B in 2014.2  The estimated capital deployed by 
                                                        
2 These estimates are by Jeffery Sohl and the University of New Hampshire’s Center 
for Venture Research: 
http://paulcollege.unh.edu/sites/paulcollege.unh.edu/files/2009_Analysis_Report.
pdf and 
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angel groups in Europe has almost doubled over the past five years, while in Canada, 
it almost tripled.3 Despite its rapid growth, we know very little about the role that 
angles play internationally and the type of firms in which they invest. 
 
 The appeal of angel investors is that they share many of the positive features 
of venture capitalists. They fund early-stage entrepreneurs, undertake intensive due 
diligence of potential investments, and serve as mentors and (sometimes) outside 
directors for the entrepreneurs (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003; Wong, Bhatia and 
Freeman, 2009). But since angels invest their own money, they should be less prone 
to agency problems that have been documented for VC funds: for instance, fee-based 
compensation structures can lead to excessive fund raising (Metrick and Yasuda, 
2010; Chung, et al., 2012) or sub-optimal investment and exit decisions (Gompers, 
1995). The consequences of these agency problems may be periods of overfunding in 
certain sectors (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). Active involvement in the investments 
and close social ties between angels and entrepreneurs may help to overcome the 
lack of minority shareholder and legal protections that are important for the 
development of more decentralized capital markets: see, for example, La Porta, et al. 
(1998, 2002). Reflecting these patterns, governments are increasingly seeking to 
encourage angel investment (Wilson, 2015). The hope is to encourage alternative 
                                                        
https://paulcollege.unh.edu/sites/paulcollege.unh.edu/files/webform/2014%20An
alysis%20Report.pdf.  
3 According to data presented in reports from EBAN in Europe and NACO in Canada, 
which is collected from angel groups via surveys.   
4 
 
mechanisms for funding new ventures and to improve the ecosystem for 
entrepreneurs. 
 
Relying on an idiosyncratic and decentralized angel investment process, 
however, might lead to challenges of its own. Since angels are typically not 
professional investors, there is a worry that entrepreneurs will be exposed 
idiosyncratic funding risk, either because angels themselves might be subject to 
idiosyncratic liquidity shocks or because they might change their opinions more 
frequently about what projects to fund. In addition, angels might not be prepared to 
invest in truly disruptive or high growth projects, since they are usually more risk 
averse than institutional investors due to limited diversification. They also might not 
have the professional expertise to invest in more complex technologies. And finally, 
there is a concern that in countries that do not have the culture or infrastructure to 
support start-up investments, angels only waste their time and money with no real 
impact. 
 
This paper seeks to understand the differences in the nature and 
consequences of angel investments across a variety of geographies with varying 
levels of venture capital markets and other forms of risk capital. We ask whether 
angel investors improve the outcomes and performance of the start-ups they invest 
in. Furthermore we want to understand whether and how the types of firms that seek 
angel funding vary with the overall entrepreneurial ecosystem in a country. For 
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example, is the pool of investments that apply for angel funding less risky, more 
developed, or focused on different industries than those in places like the U.S.? 
 
For that purpose, we examine the records of 13 angel investment groups based 
in 12 nations and with applicants for financing transactions from 21 nations, 
examining both the applicants that were considered and rejected and those that were 
funded. In order to differentiate the value added of angel groups from their ability to 
select good investments, we employ the type of regression discontinuity analysis we 
used in our earlier analysis of U.S. angel groups (this approach is similar to Kerr, 
Lerner and Schoar, 2014). We use discontinuities in the funding likelihood of start-
ups that are based on cumulative level of interest around the deal on the part of the 
angel groups. This allows us to examine not only whether angel investors overall add 
value to the companies in which they invest, but also how their impact and the types 
of transactions undertaken varies with the development of the venture markets in 
these nations.  
 
Our focus on angel groups has advantages and disadvantages. Many papers in 
the entrepreneurial finance literature rely on data-sets constructed of matched firms 
based on related few observables. In our setting, all firms seek financing from and 
achieve similar ratings by the same angel groups, and thus are much more 
homogeneous. But since these groups work collectively and were required to have a 
track record and systemized record keeping in order to be included in our study, they 
may be more successful and impactful than the typical individual angel. 
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Our key findings from the analysis are two-fold. First, angel investors have a 
positive impact on the growth of the firms they fund, their performance, and survival. 
Start-ups funded by angel investors are 14% to 23% more likely to survive for the 
next 1.5 to 3 years and grow their employment by 40% relative to non-angel funded 
start-ups. Angel funding also effects the subsequent likelihood of successful exit, 
raising it by 10% to 17%. Unlike in the U.S., however, having angel funding also seems 
to matter significantly for the ability of a firm to obtain follow-on financing. This result 
seems to suggest that angel groups outside the U.S. serve as an important 
accreditation or gateway for follow-on funding. In fact, the positive impact of follow-
on funding does not vary when we interact the main effect with proxies for the 
entrepreneur-friendliness of the countries. This result is contrary to what Kerr et al 
(2013) found for the role of angel investments in the US. It might suggest that the 
availability of risk capital in the U.S. is more abundant and therefore start-ups have 
many different avenues of obtaining their initial seed funding, including VC funding. 
As a result, firms do not necessarily have to have had an angel round before getting 
funding from larger players.4  
  
                                                        
4 Using a sample of Canadian firms, Hellmann, Schure and Vo (2015) find that prior 
angel financing reduces probability of obtaining subsequent venture capital 
financing. However, their results are driven mostly by inexperienced angels and their 
analysis is based on a country with a relatively developed risk-capital market.  By way 
of contrast, we collect data from a variety of countries and, from some of the most 
active angel groups within a particular country. Therefore, the differences in results 
might arise from the fact that our angel groups are quite sophisticated and 
experienced investors in their respective countries. See also Hellmann and Thiele 
(2014). 
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Second, we find that the selection of firms that apply for angel funding is 
different across countries. In countries that have a less conducive entrepreneurial 
environment, companies seeking angel funding appear to be older and larger on 
average and are usually already revenue generating compared to applicants in more 
entrepreneurship-friendly countries. Yet despite their apparent greater maturity, the 
firms in these markets seek smaller amounts of funding. We proxy for the 
entrepreneur friendliness of a country with (1) the depth of the VC market as a 
fraction of GDP and (2) the number of regulatory procedures while incorporating a 
firm, taken from Djankov, et al. (2002). Given that these are countries with a less 
developed ecosystem for risk capital, it is difficult to believe that entrepreneurs in 
these countries have many other sources of capital and therefore only apply for 
funding at a later stage in their life cycle. Instead, the results suggest that firms seem 
to “self-censor” when they apply to angel groups in the less venture-friendly markets, 
reflecting the fact that the angel investors themselves are more risk-averse or less 
experienced in assessing very early-stage investments. The fact that despite the more 
mature stage of these firms, they receive less funding from the angels, underscores 
that the less favorable entrepreneurial investment climate in these countries.5 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the construction 
of the data set and the key institutions at work. In Section 3, we preview the sample 
                                                        
5 We cannot rule out that in countries with less developed entrepreneurship markets, 
the demand for capital is more constrained as well, for example, if there are more 
barriers to entry on the product market side. If start-ups believe that their growth 
opportunities or the speed at which they can expand is limited, they might demand 
smaller amounts of capital. 
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and the regression discontinuity design that we employ. Section 4 presents the results 
regarding the impact of angel investment; and Section 5, those relating to the 
selection of firms into angel financing. The final section concludes the paper. 
 
2. Construction of the Data Set 
This section describes the process by which we constructed the dataset. We 
also provide a brief overview on the nature of angel investment groups worldwide. 
 
To build the dataset, we began by contacting angel groups with whom we had 
personal connections. These included cases where we had previous interactions with 
groups in previous OECD studies, those in which former students played prominent 
roles, and alumni contacts via Harvard and MIT.  In addition, we reached out to a 
number of associations and informal consortia of angels, such as the Angel Capital 
Association, to encourage participation in the study. 
 
In each case, we required that the participating angel groups: 
 Have been active investors for at least two years. 
 Have (or be able to compile) records both on applicants that were funded and 
those that were considered and rejected. 
 Have records about the degree of angel interest in potential transactions, or in 
one case, as discussed below, be able to reconstruct the level of such interest.  
These requirements eliminated many would-be participants from our effort.  
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In all, we obtained data from 13 groups. In most cases, we signed a data-
sharing agreement, which confirmed that we would ensure the anonymity of the 
groups and the portfolio companies, and limited our ability to redistribute the data, 
but did not restrict our ability to undertake academic research using the data in an 
unfettered manner. The funds were base in Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
China, Germany, Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. 
 
Angel groups included in the study range from smaller groups with a few 
members to larger groups with over 100 or more members. The membership models 
differ, from groups that are more open to those that are more selective. Some groups 
encourage new angels to join and provide training for these individuals to help them 
develop their skills and confidence in angel investing. Other groups are invitation only 
and have specific requirements regarding the background, experience and area of 
expertise of the angel investors.  
 
The angel groups differ in terms of how they originated. Some groups were 
founded by angel investors but a number were created by business people and, in 
some cases, are linked with a university or business school. In addition, some of the 
angel groups were created with support from national or regional governments.  
 
Most of the angel groups in the study invest in companies in technology-
related sectors, including, in many cases, life sciences and clean tech.  Some also invest 
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in a much broader set of sectors including arts and entertainment, consumer goods, 
education, and food and beverage. The angel groups in the study also vary in their 
geographic focus. The majority of the angel groups invest primarily in companies in 
the local or nearby communities. However some invest more broadly across the 
country or, in some cases, across borders.  
 
The structure and approach of the angel groups vary as do the selection 
processes. Many of the groups are run by professional staff but some are run by 
volunteer angels.  However, in all cases, the angel groups have pitching events in 
which selected entrepreneurial teams are invited to present their company after 
which a decision is made, either as a group or by angels individually ,whether to 
consider making an investment.  As described in the next section, two of the groups 
do not have a voting process but other proxies were used to determine angel interest.  
 
3.2. Sample Selection  
The angel groups participating in the study are from a range of countries in 
Europe, Asia Pacific, Latin America and North America, each with very different 
funding landscapes. It is important to acknowledge that within each country, our 
selection methodology and criteria are likely to lead to us getting data from the more 
organized and prominent angel groups. This fact probably means that we are 
estimating the upper bound of the impact that angels can have in a country. But across 
countries, the selection procedure was similar, so it is unlikely that we have identified 
high-caliber angel groups in same markets and lower-tier ones in others. 
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While the U.S. remains predominate in terms of the volume of venture capital 
and angel investment, angel investing, both individually as well as through groups, 
has grown in many other countries around the world (OECD, 2011). There are 
significant differences in the financial and regulatory environment across the 
countries covered in the study. For instance, the level of development of public 
markets and the formal venture capital sector may differ. Similarly, substantial 
differences exist in the administrative burdens not only of starting but also growing 
firms. There are also differences in regulation related to investment, which impact 
the incentives for institutional and individual investors to provide funding for start-
ups. These include investment rules, barriers to cross-border investment, and 
securities legislation (Wilson and Silva, 2013).  
 
It is unclear how these differences will affect the level of angel investment. If 
venture capital and angel investments are complements, the nations where venture 
activity is better developed might be also the places where angel investment is more 
effective. This complementarity might be driven by the fact that angel groups, after 
undertaking the initial financing, “hand off” their transactions to venture groups for 
subsequent financing: without a healthy venture sector, the companies may languish. 
If, on the other hand, venture capital and angel investments are substitutes—for 
instance, because both groups of investors are competing for the same transaction—
a well-developed venture market might “crowd out” angel investment or lead to 
angels funding less promising firms. Similarly, the presence of high regulatory 
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barriers to entrepreneurship may make angel investments either more or less 
effective. We will examine the impact of a number of these differences in the analyses 
below. 
 
One aspect, which we will not examine, is the numerous efforts by policy 
makers to facilitate the development of angel investments.  In some countries, policy 
makers have launched co-investment funds to address the seed/early stage equity 
financing gap and to help develop and professionalize the angel investment market. 
Other countries have put various tax incentives in place to encourage angel 
investments, mostly at the national level but sometimes at the state or provincial 
level. Other initiatives include investor readiness and investor training programs, as 
well as the direct funding of incubators, accelerators, and other matchmaking 
services. Most of these efforts are of quite recent vintage, but will present 
opportunities for study in later years. 
 
3. Data Description and Regression Discontinuity Design 
3.1 Data Description 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the final sample of 1682 deals that 
resulted from our data collection effort: a total of 295 funded and 1287 non-funded 
companies. Because our sample consists of small, privately held firms, and the 
incomplete record-keeping by the angel groups, determining the outcomes of these 
investments was challenging. We proceeded in the following manner: 
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1. Angel group information: The angel groups in many cases tracked key 
information about the firms that they had funded. Coverage of firms that the 
angel groups had not funded, however, was much poorer. 
2. Internet searches. We examined the website URLs that were provided to the 
angel groups at the time the companies sought financing. In addition, we 
sought to identify such company websites (or other websites with relevant 
information), using Google, Baidu, and LinkedIn searches, employing the 
company and founder names as search elements. Finally, we used the domains 
suggested by the email addresses of the founders to identify relevant websites. 
These sites yielded information about, among other information, the founders, 
firm status, employment, and investors. When they encountered foreign-
language sites, we used students or Harvard Business School staff researchers 
with the requisite language skills to examine the websites in hopes of gleaning 
relevant information. 
3. Corporate and financing databases. We turned to the two primary corporate 
databases with broad coverage of international entrepreneurial firms, 
CapitalIQ and Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database. These entries yielded 
information about the founder, firm addresses, employees, number of and 
total amount in investment rounds, and firm outcomes. We also examined the 
specific databases of initial public offerings and acquisitions compiled by 
Thomson Reuters. All financing sums were in (or were converted into using 
contemporaneous exchange rates) U.S. dollars. 
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4. Venture capital-specific databases. We also examined databases that cover 
venture capital financings. These were Thomson Reuters’ VentureXpert, 
CrunchBase, and the Emerging Markets Private Equity Association database. 
These contained data on financings raised, founders, and subsequent changes 
in firm status. 
5. News stories. We searched on company name for relevant news stories in the 
Factiva database. This provided information about the company status, exit 
events, and the founders. 
6. Patents. We collected information about U.S. patent awards through the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) website, as well as the Thompson 
Innovations database. While the latter database has a large amount of 
information about patent filings worldwide, we focused solely on U.S. awards 
to ensure consistency. 
7. Direct contacts: We contacted the companies directly via email and cellular 
phone (contact information was typically gathered by the angel groups as part 
of the application process). In order to undertake the email and phone 
contacts, we employed students with the necessary language skills.  
 
Due to the challenges in gathering data, we focus on a relatively modest set of 
outcomes, not seeking to gather information that would be likely to be perceived as 
too proprietary or complex to gather in a short call (e.g., balance sheet and income 
statement information, or valuation data). Instead, we focus on the following 
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measures (all data was collected over the period between February and October 
2014, and was for the time of our contact with the firm, unless otherwise noted): 
 Survival of the firm. 
 Survival of the firm for at least 18 months after the original application to the 
angel group (to control for the fact that these firms’ initial financing occurred 
at various points in time, and hence they had different times to survive until 
2014). 
 A successful exit, defined following the earlier literature (e.g., Hochberg, 
Ljungqvist, and Lu, 2007) as an initial public offering or an acquisition. While 
ideally we would distinguish between acquisitions at attractive and 
unattractive valuations, given data limitations, this was not feasible. 
 Employment at the firm. 
 The number of patents awarded to the firm by the USPTO, both within 18 
months of the original application to the angel group and at the time of the 
final observation. 
 Whether any of the founders were still with the company, and whether any of 
the founders were still CEO of the firm. 
 Whether the firm received any subsequent financing and any venture capital 
financing specifically. 
 The total amount of subsequent financing raised. 
 
Table 1 shows that the average applicant had ten employees at the application 
stage, with three of them representing the firm’s management team. It was also 
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seeking to raise US$1.2 million from the angel group. These numbers are somewhat 
smaller relative to what Kerr, Lerner and Schoar (2014) reported when relying solely 
on the U.S. data. This information suggests that entrepreneurial firms outside of the 
U.S are smaller at the application stage.  The distribution of the venture’s stage of 
development is heavily skewed towards firms that are already marketing their 
products and revenue-generating firms.  These results imply that firms apply for 
angel financing when they have an established business concept and already have 
made progress in the development of their products or services. In fact, 40% of 
ventures applying for funding already generated some revenue.  
 
We also observe substantial differences between funded and non-funded 
deals. In particular, funded ventures tend to be significantly larger and are more likely 
to be revenue generating at the time of the application. In addition, we can observe 
that the industry distributions of funded and non-funded deals are also very different, 
with greater representation among the funded of biomedical and electronics firms, 
and less of Internet and e-commerce concerns. These results might be driven by 
cross-country composition of our sample if angels in different countries face different 
sets of deals. We will turn to a composition analysis later in the paper. 
 
3.2 Identifying discontinuities   
The key ingredient of our identification strategy is constructing a measure of 
angel interest that reflects the fact that angel group provide funding with a certain 
degree of randomness.  Following Kerr, Lerner, and Schoar (2014), we obtain 
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information on voting patterns of each of the angel groups to construct such a 
variable. For each group, we collect information on the number of angels that 
expressed interest in a particular deal, as well as on the total number of angels that 
were able to evaluate that deal.  Having this information, we proceed to a construction 
of our group-specific angel interest measure. 
 
We observe two key voting patterns across our sample groups. For the first 
type of groups, the number of angels that participate in deal evaluation remains 
relatively constant.  In these cases, we use a number of angels that were interested in 
a deal as our measure of angel interest. For the second type of groups, the total 
number of angels varies across deals. Usually, we observe growth in a total number 
of members because the group is expanding over time.  In these cases, the absolute 
number of interested angels is not very informative about the overall level of interest. 
Therefore, for these deals, we calculate a share of angels that expressed interest and 
use this number of our measure of angel interest.   
 
 In two cases, the information on voting patterns was not available. In the first 
case, angels use a scoring system on a scale of 0-5 when evaluating potential deals.  
For this group, we use an average score that a venture received as a measure of angel 
interest.  In the second case, we asked group’s founder to evaluate the level of interest 
for a particular deal on a scale of 0-5.  We realize that this measure might be biased, 
because it is subjective and is reported after the funding decision was made.  The 
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results were robust to the exclusion of this group’s transactions form the analysis 
below. 
  
Having defined a group level measure of interest, we proceed to the 
identification of discontinuities in probability of being funded as a function of angel 
interest. As our sample groups do not have explicit funding cutoffs, we must identify 
breaks using observed voting behavior. We follow the procedure described in Kerr, 
Lerner, and Schoar (2014). For each group we identify a “funding discontinuity”: the 
critical level of interest that translates into a substantial increase in the funding 
probability.  Once such a level of interest is determined, we generate a narrow sample 
of ventures that are either just above or just below the funding discontinuity. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the process of identifying the funding discontinuity and the 
construction of the border sample for one of the groups that participated in the study.  
First, we plot the probability of being funded by an angel group together with a 
measure of angel interest (the share of angels interested in this particular case).  The 
likelihood of obtaining funding generally increases with angel interest, as expected.  
Second, we observe that the biggest increase in funding probability occurs around an 
interest level of 30%. In particular, when the level of interest crosses 30%, the 
funding probability increases dramatically: from 2% to 15%.   We identify this 
threshold as the funding discontinuity and the firms that had similar levels of interest 
(20%-40%) as a border sample. We refer to deals that obtained interest levels of 
20%-30% as “below the border” deals and to the deals that obtained interest levels 
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of 30%-40% as “above the border” deals. This process is repeated for every group 
that participated in our study. 
 
Table 2 provides an overview of the construction of the border sample. For 
each group it presents the indication of angel interest used to determine the 
discontinuity, the range that in which the border group fell, the cutoff employed, and 
the sample size.  
 
In each case, we also present the difference in the probability of funding for 
groups in the border sample above and below and discontinuity. We present these 
differences on an absolute and relative basis. For instance, for group 1, the mean 
probability of being funded if in the border sample and below the cutoff is 2%, while 
if in the sample and above the cutoff it is 15%, for an absolute difference of 13% and 
a relative difference of 750%. We explore below the robustness of the analysis to 
alternative definition of the border sample. 
 
Our central identifying assumption is that characteristics of ventures are 
similar around the funding discontinuity. In other words, certain ventures fell above 
the funding discontinuity only because they randomly obtained a slightly higher level 
of interest. It is reasonable to assume that there is enough heterogeneity in angels’ 
preferences and their subjective evaluations such that their aggregated level of 
interest exhibits some degree of randomness and does not perfectly match with 
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underlying venture’s quality. In addition, we verify empirically below that above the 
border and below the border ventures do not differ in their observed characteristics. 
 
3.3 Description of “threshold deals” 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for our “border” sample of 578 deals. 
We have 343 ventures below the border discontinuity and 235 ventures above the 
border. The difference in number reflects the fact that the funding discontinuities are 
group-specific and the within-group distribution of ventures around the border is not 
always even.  We also observe that the venture characteristics in the border sample 
are similar to those of the entire sample as presented in Table 1.   
 
Table 3 is also informative about incomplete data in our border sample. As it 
shows, we were not able to obtain a complete set of characteristics for every single 
venture: this is especially true for the amount of financing that a venture was seeking.  
We observe that distribution of “gaps” is not different around the funding 
discontinuity. In fact, we have slightly more information about the “below the cutoff” 
ventures, which is consistent with having more observations in total for this set of 
firms. 
 
We perform two sets of analysis to verify comparability of the two border 
groups. First, we look into the simple difference in means between the groups. The 
results show that ventures above the border discontinuity have slightly larger 
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management teams and exhibit a different distribution of the stage of firm 
development. 
 
These differences might arise, however, from the fact that the border sample 
combines a number of angel groups that face quite different sets of deals.  To 
overcome this issue, we demeaned venture’s characteristics one by one using its 
group-level means and rerun our balance tests. The results indicate that none of the 
demeaned differences are statistically significant. Therefore, we conclude that the 
results from the first test were driven by differences across angel groups. After 
accounting for these differences, the border firms are very comparable in terms of 
firm size, as well as industry and stage compositions.6  
 
A final concern might be that we have much more information about the 
outcomes of transactions above the discontinuity than those below it. In an 
unreported analysis, we compare the availability of outcome data for the 578 firms in 
the border sample. We have data on eleven different outcomes (e.g., number of 
patents, whether the firm was acquired): seven outcomes have full coverage, with 
data on all the firms, and four outcomes have partial coverage. For the cases with 
                                                        
6 In an unreported analysis, we undertook "enhanced demeaning". Instead of running 
demeaned t-tests, we ran regressions of firm's characteristics on "above the cutoff" 
dummy and fixed effects. The coefficient on the "above the cutoff" dummy was never 
significant, which means that after controlling for fixed effects, the status relative to 
the cutoff was not correlated with firm's characteristics. This result implies that the 
firms above the cutoff and below the cutoff have similar characteristics, as we argue 
above. 
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partial outcome data, the coverage is nearly identical for the groups above and below 
the discontinuity. The one exception is employment, where the coverage is 
substantially higher for the above the cutoff firms (66%) than those below (45%). 
Therefore, it is unlikely that our key results are driven by the differences in the 
availability of information about the outcomes across firms. 
  
4. Results of Regression Discontinuity Analysis 
Having established the presence of a discontinuity, we now go further towards 
exploring the relationship between angel funding and firm outcomes relationship by 
using a regression discontinuity approach (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).  As we have 
argued in Section 3, there exists a discrete jump in the probability of venture funding 
as interest accumulates around a deal.  
 
We first compare the outcomes of firms in the bands above and below the 
discontinuities. As we showed in Section 3, these firms look similar in terms of their 
characteristics prior to approaching the angel group. But the outcomes, as we will see 
below, are quite different. 
 
Table 4 summarizes the key findings. The firms above the discontinuity are 
significantly more likely to survive in the short and longer run, as well as to undergo 
a successful exit. For instance, the probability of a successful exit is four times greater 
(25% vs. 6%).  These firms are also significantly more likely to raise subsequent 
financing.  
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Comparing the results to those found in Kerr, Lerner, and Schoar (2014), there 
is a similar pattern in that firms that are above the discontinuity are more likely to 
survive, as well as (more weakly) to undergo a successful exit. The U.S. firms studied 
in the earlier paper that were above the angel financing discontinuity were more 
likely to patent, an effect not seen here, perhaps reflecting the relative ineffectualness 
of formal intellectual property protection in many of these markets or the barriers to 
small non-U.S. firms in seeking U.S. protection. Finally, the U.S. firms did not display a 
significantly higher probability of raising additional financing, unlike these firms. This 
may reflect the relative immaturity of many of the markets in this study, where 
accessing early-stage financing may be more of a struggle. 
 
Another important way to look at the division of outcomes is to examine how 
these vary by nationality of the firm. Again, we focus on firms around the funding 
discontinuity.  We examine two partitions: whether the angel group (not the applicant 
firm)7 is located in a nation with above or below the median level in terms of venture 
capital activity (computed as venture capital investment as a fraction of GDP, as of 
2010, compiled from various national and regional venture and private equity 
                                                        
7 We decided to focus on 12 countries the groups come from and not the 21 countries 
that firms comes from, because we find that most of the investment is local, i.e., 
American groups invest primarily into American firms, etc. There are a very small 
number of foreign investments by these groups, driven by a few organizations in 
small nations. There is consequently not enough variation to analyze both the firm's 
country and the angel group's country simultaneously. When we repeat the analysis 
using firm's country instead, the analysis does not yield any different results. 
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associations), and in the barriers to entrepreneurial activity, measured by the 
number of steps required to start a business, as reported by Djankov, et al., (2002).  
 
It is worth highlighting that many of the measures of the entrepreneurial 
environment across nations are highly correlated.  For instance, across the 12 nations 
in which angel groups are located, the correlation between one of the measures we 
use, the number of steps to form a business, is strongly negative with such metrics as 
the Heritage Foundation index of property rights in 2004 (-0.77), GDP per capita in 
2010, as reported by the World Bank (-0.71), and the creditor rights index in Djankov, 
McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) (-0.43), and positively correlated with the estimated 
cost of starting a business from World Bank’s 2010 Doing Business report (0.80).  
Similarly, there is a strong negative correlation between two measures that we use 
here (-0.47).  
 
We picked up these variables because we see these as proxies for the overall 
entrepreneurship-friendliness of the country. We should not be seen as arguing that 
these analyses "identify" a specific channel. When we repeat these analyses using the 
alternative measures—e.g., GDP per capita, the creditor rights measure, or the index 
of property rights—we get similar results. The correlations across the various 
country-level variables (with each country as an observation) are reported in 
Appendix Table I. All variables are defined in Appendix Table II. 
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We see in Table 5 that success does vary with the national environment. In 
nations with above the median level of venture capital activity, firms are more likely 
to have a successful exit, to experience growth in employment and patenting, and to 
raise additional financing. In countries that are more entrepreneur friendly (i.e., those 
requiring fewer steps to start a business), firms are more likely to survive, to patent 
more, and to raise additional financing. Interestingly, in these nations, founders are 
less likely to remain with the firm, which may reflect greater pressures from outside 
financiers to professionalize these firms’ managements (Hellmann and Puri, 2002).8 
 
Having established the presence of these differences in univariate 
comparisons, we now turn to regression discontinuity analyses. Table 6 documents 
the probability that a firm raises angel financing, as a function of its position relative 
to the funding discontinuity. Thus, the analysis formally tests whether there is a 
significant discontinuity in funding around the thresholds for the ventures 
considered by these groups. The dependent variable is an indicator variable that 
equals one if the firm received funding and zero otherwise. The primary explanatory 
variable is an indicator variable for the venture being above or below the 
discontinuity.  
 
Column 1 presents a regression with just a constant, while successive columns 
control for angel group fixed effects, year fixed effects, and industry fixed effects, as 
                                                        
8  In later tables, we include controls for angel groups and industry, among other 
considerations, to control for unobserved differences. 
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well as other observed characteristics of the ventures at the time of the application 
date, such as the stage of development, employment, management team size, amount 
of financing sought, and a number for patents awarded by USPTO.  As in Tables 3 and 
4, we have 578 deals that are distributed above and below the discontinuity. (When 
we employ the venture-specific variables, the sample size drops considerably to 307.)  
 
We find that there is a statistically and economically significant relationship 
between funding likelihood and being above the funding threshold: a firm’s presence 
above the border increases the funding likelihood by between 18 and 30%. Clearly, 
the border line designation is not a perfect rule—and this fuzziness will limit below 
how strongly we can interpret the regression discontinuity—but it does signify a very 
strong shift in funding probability among ventures that are ex ante comparable, as 
shown in Tables 2 and 3. 
 
Tables 7 and 8 then present the regression analyses of the impact of angel 
financing on firm outcomes. Again, we use in each case the sample of firms near the 
cutoff, and run specifications using the entire (or almost the entire) sample (when 
employing angel group, year, and industry fixed effects) and the smaller 307-firm 
sub-sample (when using the venture-level controls). We examine a subset of the 
outcomes considered in Tables 3 and 4.  
 
In Table 7, we use whether the firm received angel financing as the key independent 
variable; in Table 8, whether the firm was above the funding discontinuity. The results are 
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quite similar across the two analyses: in each case, the angel-funded (or more likely to be 
funded) ventures are more likely to survive, to have a successful exit, and to raise 
subsequent financing, as well as to hire additional employees.  
 
The results are somewhat more consistently statistically significant when the 
regression discontinuity approach is employed (that is, in Table 8). For example, in the first 
specification of Table 8, Panel A, moving from below to above the cutoff increases the 
probability of venture's survival in the years after the application for financing by 18%, 
relative to a mean of 73%. In the fifth regression, moving from below to above the cutoff 
increases the probability of IPO or acquisition by 16%, relative to a mean of 15%. In the 
seventh and eighth regressions moving from below to above the cutoff increases increase 
the number of employees by approximately 40%. In the fifth regression in Panel B, moving 
from below to above the cutoff increases the probability of raising additional financing by 
16%, relative to a mean of 29%. 
 
As discussed above, one concern is that the results are an artifact of the 
particular border sample chosen. In an unreported set of regressions, we repeat the 
analysis in Table 8, now using more narrow ranges than those denoted in Table 2: for 
each group we look at a border sample that is one-half the size of the reported 
analysis. For instance, for Group 1, we narrow the border sample to ventures with a 
level of interest between 25% (instead of 20%) and 35% (instead of 40%). When we 
use this smaller sample (for instance, the unreported version of the first regression 
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in Table 8 has 226 observations rather than 568 observations in the reported 
analysis), significance levels fall somewhat, but the results are qualitatively similar. 
 
We finally consider how these outcomes vary with the national environment: 
that is, whether the impact of angel investment is different in settings which are more 
entrepreneur-friendly or where venture activity is more prevalent. To undertake 
these analyses, we repeat the analyses in Table 8, adding as independent variables 
one of the two measures of the national environment we use above and an interaction 
between this measure and the dummy variable indicating whether the firm was 
above the funding discontinuity. 
 
The results, reported in Table 9, are striking. As in Table 8, the increased 
likelihood of angel financing has a strongly positive impact on outcomes. A more 
entrepreneur-friendly environment also translates into a greater probability of 
survival and of subsequent financing. More venture capital activity is associated with 
a greater probability of subsequent financing, but a lower chance of survival. But most 
interesting are the interaction effects: in all but two regressions, the interaction 
between the national environment and being above the cutoff for angel financing is 
insignificant. This suggests the positive impact of angel financing on the development 
of portfolio firms remains consistent across the nations under study, regardless of the 
level of venture activity and the entrepreneur-friendliness of the environment.9 
                                                        
9 Due to the concerns discussed above about the broad range of ways in which in the 
countries of the angel groups can be characterized, we also take an alternative 
approach to characterizing nations. We run a principal components analysis using a 
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5. Results Regarding Sample Selection  
The stark differential impact that angel funding has in the US compared to 
other countries might point to the fact that the type of firms that select into angel 
funding are different between countries. In particular, one more mechanical story 
would be that in Europe, younger or less mature firms get angel funding and therefore 
angels have a greater role in follow on funding.  For that purpose, we analyze to what 
extent do the criteria for funding employed by angels vary with the national setting? 
We first undertake univariate comparisons of the companies applying to the angel 
groups; and then also replicate our results in a regression analyses format. We show 
that the mechanical selection story mentioned above does not explain our results. 
 
We begin by examining all the 1682 firms which were considered by the angel 
groups; we then turn to the 578 firms in our cutoff sample. In Table 10, we compare 
the two samples of firms—whether funded or not—in nations with above and below 
the median number of steps to start a business, as well as those with above and below 
the median venture capital to GDP ratio. 
                                                        
number of key country characteristics that capture the level of economic and financial 
development, as well as the costs of doing business. We find that the first component 
explains 63% of the variation in the country characteristics. Moreover, it loads 
strongly positively on the development variables such as GDP per capita, index of 
property rights, and VC/GDP ratio. The first principal component also loads strongly 
negatively on a number of variables that capture costs of doing business, including 
the variable that we use in the paper. We repeat the analyses in Tables 9 and 11, using 
the first principal component score, as well as the other measures, in lieu of the 
national characteristics. The results are very similar to the reported ones. 
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We find a striking pattern: when we look at the entire population of applicants 
in Panel A, the firms look very different across the nations. In environments that were 
less entrepreneur friendly or where the venture market was less well developed, the 
firms had more employees (though smaller management teams) and were less likely 
to be in the early stages of development. These companies also were seeking a smaller 
amount of funding. In part, these differences may reflect industry composition: for 
instance, the firms in these less venture friendly markets were more likely to be 
Internet and e-commerce firms, which may be asset-light. But these differences may 
reflect choices by entrepreneurs about which start-ups can realistically succeed and 
raise funding in these markets.  
 
Turning in Panel B to the subset of firms in the cutoff sample, we see that very 
similar patterns hold. The firms seriously considered for funding in less venture-
friendly markets tended to be larger, at a later stage of development, and to seek less 
funding. While these patterns are seen in the choice of firms under careful scrutiny of 
the groups, it also reflects (as we saw in Panel A), the overall pool of applicants for 
funding. 
 
Having demonstrated these patterns in a univariate analysis, we now turn to 
a regression analysis. Here we use the entire sample of 1682 firms seeking financing 
from these angel groups (i.e., the same sample in Panel A of Table 10). We compare 
the firms on the basis of various ex ante characteristics, including employment, 
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management team size, the amount of financing sought, and the firm’s stage of 
development. We control for whether the firm ultimately received angel financing, 
the characteristics of the national venture environment, and the interaction between 
these two factors. 
 
Table 11 shows that there are substantial differences across countries. We see 
that the angel-funded companies tend to have more employment and larger 
management teams, to seek more funding, and are less likely to be in the early stages. 
In Panels A and B, we see that in nations which are less entrepreneur friendly, the 
ventures seeking angel financing tend to have more employees, smaller management 
teams, and are less likely to be in the early stages. In nations with less venture funding 
(Panel C and D), the ventures have similar features: they tend to have smaller 
management teams, to seek more funding, and are less likely to be in the early stages. 
Unlike those in the entrepreneur-unfriendly nations, though, they tend to have fewer 
employees. 
 
What is more striking is the almost universal lack of significance of the 
interaction terms: only one of the 12 interactions is significant at the 5% confidence 
level, and two at the 10% level. (The large coefficients on the interaction terms in 
Panels C and D reflects the fact that the VC/GDP ratio is quite modest.) It appears that 
while the mixture of companies funded by angel groups shows distinct patterns 
across nations, this reflects the companies applying to seek angel financing, rather 
than their choices within the set of applicants. Consistent with a story in which firms 
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rationally anticipate which types of deals will be attractive to angel investors in that 
country, in markets with a less developed venture environment,  firms appear to set 
a higher bar when deciding whether to apply for angel financing. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Angel investors are attracting increasing interest from financial economists 
and policy makers alike, reflecting their apparent ability to solve some of the 
information problems that other types of investors seem to have problems solving . 
This paper examines a cross-section of 13 angel groups who considered transactions 
across 21 countries, exploiting information both on transactions they funded and 
those they passed on, as well as the groups’ evaluations of the potential transactions. 
 
We find that, consistent with the evidence from the United States, angel 
investors have positive impact on the growth, performance, and survival of the firms 
they fund. The positive impact of angel financing on portfolio firms remains 
consistent across the nations under study, regardless of the nation’s level of venture 
activity and its entrepreneur friendliness. However, international angel funds, 
different form U.S. angels, positively enhance the ability of the funded firms to obtain 
follow-on financing. This suggests that angels have a more important gatekeeper or 
accreditation role in countries outside the US.  At the same time we show that there 
is self-selection of firms that are funded by angels in less developed venture 
environments: Only more mature businesses, with more proven cash flows and 
seeking fewer funds, apply to angels. This might be the outcome of self-censoring by 
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very early stage start-ups who do not expect to receive funding from angel groups, 
who themselves might be more risk averse or inexperienced in making very early-
stage investments. 
 
This work suggests a variety of avenues for future research. First, we have 
suggested that one channel by which angel investors adapt to the changing 
investment environment across nations is by selecting different transactions (though 
this is at least partially determined by differences in the mixture of firms applying for 
funding). It would be interesting to examine whether angel groups adjust in different 
ways, whether by varying the contracts that they enter into with the entrepreneurs 
they fund (as Lerner and Schoar (2005) document that venture capital and private 
equity funds do) or by adjusting the intensity of oversight provided. Another fertile 
area for research would examine the evolution of the role of these investors in 
markets such as China and India, where venture capitalists (as opposed to the more 
established private equity funds) appear to have been gaining traction in recent years. 
Differences in practices and impact of angel groups located in varying regions in 
particular countries may provide another fertile area for exploration. 
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Figure 1 Voting Pattern of a Representative Group 
 
 
Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics 
Venture’s Characteristics Full sample Funded 
ventures 
Non-Funded 
ventures 
Funded vs. Non-funded  
     
Employment 9.939 13.29 9.181 4.109*** 
 (22.15) (33.72) (18.49) (1.542) 
Management team size 3.391 3.799 3.297 0.502*** 
 (1.783) (1.848) (1.755) (0.121) 
Financing sought (USD, thousands) 1,186 1,381 1,140 240.5 
 (2,868) (3,955) (2,557) (193.4) 
Stage of development     
     
Initial Idea 0.186 0.119 0.201 -0.0815*** 
 (0.389) (0.325) (0.401) (0.0266) 
Marketing and development 0.422 0.412 0.424 -0.0124 
 (0.494) (0.493) (0.494) (0.0339) 
Revenue generating 0.392 0.469 0.375 0.0939*** 
 (0.488) (0.500) (0.484) (0.0335) 
Industry     
     
Biopharma, cleantech and healthcare 0.141 0.231 0.117 0.114*** 
 (0.348) (0.422) (0.321) (0.0221) 
Computers, electronics and measurement 0.147 0.190 0.130 0.0599*** 
 (0.354) (0.393) (0.336) (0.0225) 
Financial, educational and professional services 0.0937 0.108 0.0976 0.0108 
 (0.291) (0.312) (0.297) (0.0194) 
Internet and e-commerce 0.183 0.0983 0.217 -0.118*** 
 (0.386) (0.298) (0.412) (0.0254) 
Technology, media and telecommunication 0.0985 0.0881 0.106 -0.0174 
 (0.298) (0.284) (0.307) (0.0196) 
Other 0.337 0.285 0.334 -0.0491 
 (0.473) (0.452) (0.472) (0.0303) 
     
     
Observations 1,682 295 1,287  
    Table presents the descriptive statistics of the entire set of 1,682 deals. Column 1 shows means and standard errors of ventures characteristics for the full sample. Columns 2 
and 3 present information for funded and non-funded ventures separately. Column 4 tests for the equality of the means between funded and non-funded ventures and presents 
the differences between the means. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Table 2: Definitions of interest measures and cutoffs across groups 
 
Table presents the definitions of interest measures and funding cutoffs across groups. Column 2 presents measures of angel’s interest for each group. If the 
level of interest for a venture falls in the range shown in column 3, a venture is classified as a part of the “border” sample. Column 4 shows the “cutoff” 
levels of interest and column 5 shows the “border” sample size. Column 6 shows the differences in average funding probability between ventures that are 
above and below the cutoff. Column 7 shows the differences in relative average funding probability between ventures that are above and below the cutoff.  
Relative funding probability is not reported when the probability to get funded for ventures below the cutoff is zero. 
Group Angel interest measure Around 
the border 
range 
Cutoff Border 
sample size 
Absolute funding 
probability change 
– above the cutoff 
vs. below the 
cutoff 
Relative funding 
probability change 
– above the cutoff 
vs. below the 
cutoff 
1 
 
Share of angels that 
expressed interest 
 
20%-40% 30% 107 
 
13% 750% 
2 
 
Subjective measure of 
interest (1-5 scale) 
 
3-4 3.5 51 
 
41% 232% 
3 
 
Number of angels that 
expressed interest 
 
1-9 5 41 44% 218% 
4 
 
Number of angels that 
expressed interest 
 
5-14 10 20 63% * 
 
5 
 
 
Number of angels that 
expressed interest 
5-14 10 29 16% 245% 
6 
 
 
Number of angels that 
expressed interest 
1-9 5 30 63% 415% 
7 
 
 
Average score given 
by angels (1-5 scale) 
 
3-4 3.5 76 9% 250% 
8 
 
Share of angels that 
expressed interest 
 
70%-90% 80% 22 23% 264% 
9 
 
 
Share of angels that 
expressed interest 
60%-80% 70% 21 23% * 
 
10 
 
Number of angels that 
expressed interest 
 
5-15 10 39 10% 143% 
11 
 
 
Number of angels that 
expressed interest 
0-5 3 28 40% 221% 
12 Number of angels that 
expressed interest 
 
10-34 20 94 19% 166% 
13 Average score given 
by angels 
80%-
100% 
90% 43 43% 146% 
Table 3 - Balance Test for the Cutoff Sample 
Venture’s Characteristics Cutoff 
Sample 
Above the cutoff 
ventures 
Below the cutoff 
ventures 
Above vs. 
below 
Above vs. below – 
demeaned difference 
Employment at the time of submission 10.25 11.53 9.293 2.235 2.350 
 (16.18) (15.74) (16.46) (1.537) (1.489) 
Observations 452 193 259   
Management team size 3.532 3.731 3.381 0.350** 0.178 
 (1.803) (2.038) (1.591) (0.165) (0.128) 
Observations 481 207 274   
Financing sought (USD, thousands) 845.6 915.2 800.1 115.1 124.1 
 (1,405) (1,462) (1,369) (150.7) (145.3) 
Observations 364 144 220   
Patent count 1.23 1.27 1.20 0.07 0.02 
 (6.56) (5.75) (7.07) (6.47) (4.58) 
Observations 578 235 343   
Stage of Development      
Initial idea 0.155 0.113 0.188 -0.0742** -0.0652 
 (0.362) (0.318) (0.391) (0.0339) (0.0629) 
Marketing and development 0.399 0.350 0.438 -0.0877* -0.0823 
 (0.490) (0.478) (0.497) (0.0459) (0.0638) 
Revenue generating 0.447 0.537 0.375 0.162*** 0.148 
 (0.498) (0.500) (0.485) (0.0462) (0.0941) 
Observations 459 203 256   
Industry      
Biopharma, cleantech and healthcare 0.189 0.209 0.175 0.0336 0.00393 
 (0.392) (0.407) (0.380) (0.0332) (0.0321) 
Computers, electronics and measurement 0.201 0.238 0.175 0.0634* 0.0706 
 (0.401) (0.427) (0.380) (0.0339) (0.0525) 
Financial, educational and professional services 0.138 0.128 0.146 -0.0181 -0.0264 
 (0.346) (0.334) (0.353) (0.0293) (0.0297) 
Internet and e-commerce 0.142 0.115 0.160 -0.0455 -0.0497 
 (0.349) (0.320) (0.367) (0.0295) (0.0379) 
Technology, media and telecommunication 0.130 0.132 0.128 0.00364 0.0104 
 (0.336) (0.339) (0.335) (0.0285) (0.0281) 
Other 0.201 0.179 0.216 -0.0370 -0.00890 
 (0.401) (0.384) (0.412) (0.0339) (0.0332) 
Observations 578 235 343   
Total Observations 578 235 343   
Table compares the ex-ante characteristics of 578 ventures below and above the funding cutoff. Column 1 shows means and standard errors of ventures characteristics. Columns 2 and 3 present 
information for ventures below and above the cutoff separately. Column 4 tests for the equality of the means between ventures below and above the cutoff and presents the differences between the 
means. Column 5 tests for the equality of the means between ventures below and above the cutoff when venture’s characteristics are demeaned using group-level means. *, ** and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 Table 4 - Outcomes for cutoff ventures  
Outcomes Above the 
cutoff 
ventures 
Below the 
cutoff 
ventures 
Above 
vs. below 
Survival    
(0,1)Venture is in operation or underwent a successful exit 0.770 0.542 0.228*** 
 (0.422) (0.499) (0.0397) 
(0,1)Venture has a minimum of 1.5 years of operations since the financing event 0.787 0.636 0.152*** 
 (0.410) (0.482) (0.0385) 
Success    
(0,1)Venture underwent IPO or acquisition 0.251 0.0641 0.187*** 
 (0.435) (0.245) (0.0284) 
Operations and growth    
Employment count as of today 25.26 23.87 1.397 
 (30.68) (67.22) (5.916) 
Patent count after 1.5 years since the application for angel financing 1.923 1.936 -0.0125 
 (6.937) (9.583) (0.729) 
Patent count as of today 5.200 5.446 -0.246 
 (16.21) (20.91) (1.621) 
Founder’s status    
(0,1) At least one of the founders is still with the venture 0.813 0.830 -0.0170 
 (0.391) (0.377) (0.0413) 
Founder is a CEO 0.624 0.564 0.0596 
 (0.486) (0.497) (0.0586) 
Subsequent financing    
(0,1)Venture received any subsequent financing 0.417 0.204 0.213*** 
 (0.494) (0.404) (0.0375) 
(0,1)Venture received subsequent VC financing 0.230 0.105 0.125*** 
 (0.422) (0.307) (0.0303) 
Total subsequent financing raised (USD, millions) 14.09 10.94 3.152 
 (50.91) (17.15) (7.905) 
    
Observations 235 343  
Table presents the outcome information for 578 ventures below and above the funding cutoff. Columns1 and 2 present information for ventures below and above the cutoff 
separately. Column 3 tests for the equality of the means between ventures below and above the funding cutoff and presents the differences between the means. *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
  
 
 
Table 5 - Venture’s outcomes across countries 
 Ventures in countries 
 Outcomes Cutoff 
sample 
with 
above the 
median 
VC to 
GDP 
Ratio 
with 
below the 
median 
VC to 
GDP 
Ratio 
Above 
vs. below 
with 
above the 
median 
number 
of steps to 
open 
business 
with 
below the 
median 
number 
of steps to 
open 
business 
Above 
vs. below 
Survival        
(0,1) Venture is in operation or underwent a successful 
exit 
0.635 0.650 0.625 0.025 0.531 0.722 -0.191*** 
 (0.482) (0.478) (0.485) (0.041) (0.500) (0.449) (0.040) 
(0,1) Venture has a minimum of 1.5 years of operations 
since the financing event 
0.697 0.668 0.716 -0.048 0.649 0.737 -0.088** 
 (0.460) (0.472) (0.452) (0.039) (0.478) (0.441) (0.038) 
Success        
(0,1) Venture underwent IPO or acquisition 0.140 0.243 0.074 0.169*** 0.080 0.190 -0.110*** 
 (0.347) (0.430) (0.262) (0.029) (0.272) (0.393) (0.029) 
Operations and growth        
Employment count as of today 24.564 36.936 17.827 19.110*** 19.896 27.684 -7.788 
 (52.170) (78.225) (27.632) (6.096) (32.536) (61.812) (6.021) 
Patent count after 1.5 years since the application for angel 
financing 
1.931 2.562 1.526 1.036 0.969 2.728 -1.758** 
 (8.599) (7.886) (9.015) (0.732) (8.926) (8.248) (0.715) 
Patent count as of today 5.346 9.606 2.611 6.995*** 1.504 8.532 -7.028*** 
 (19.121) (24.380) (14.170) (1.605) (14.114) (21.959) (1.572) 
Observations 578 226 352  262 316  
Table compares the ex-ante characteristics of 578 ventures below and above the funding cutoff across countries. Column 1 shows means and standard errors of ventures outcomes. Columns 2 
and 3 present information for deals in countries with VC to GDP Ratio above the median and deals in countries with below the median VC to GDP ratio. Column 4 tests for the equality of the 
means from columns 2 and 3 and presents the differences between the means. Columns 5 and 6 compare  information for deals in countries where number of steps to open business is above the 
median to deals in countries where this number of below the median. Column 7 tests for the equality of the means from columns 5 and 6 and presents the differences between the means. *, ** 
and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 5 - Venture’s outcomes across countries (continued) 
 Ventures in countries 
 Outcomes Cutoff 
sample 
with 
above the 
median 
VC to 
GDP 
Ratio 
with 
below the 
median 
VC to 
GDP 
Ratio 
Above 
vs. below 
with 
above the 
median 
number 
of steps to 
open 
business 
with 
below the 
median 
number 
of steps to 
open 
business 
Above 
vs. below 
Founder’s status        
(0,1) At least one of the founders is still with the venture 0.822 0.783 0.845 -0.063 0.894 0.774 0.120*** 
 (0.383) (0.414) (0.362) (0.042) (0.309) (0.419) (0.041) 
Founder is a CEO 0.590 0.545 0.615 -0.070 0.648 0.546 0.102* 
 (0.493) (0.500) (0.488) (0.061) (0.480) (0.499) (0.058) 
Subsequent financing        
(0,1) Venture received any subsequent financing 0.291 0.412 0.213 0.198*** 0.122 0.430 -0.308*** 
 (0.454) (0.493) (0.410) (0.038) (0.328) (0.496) (0.036) 
(0,1) Venture received subsequent VC financing 0.156 0.230 0.108 0.122*** 0.061 0.234 -0.173*** 
 (0.363) (0.422) (0.311) (0.031) (0.240) (0.424) (0.029) 
Total subsequent financing raised (USD, millions) 12.767 20.145 3.348 16.797** 3.356 15.202 -11.847 
 (40.204) (52.543) (4.692) (7.696) (5.031) (44.768) (9.593) 
        
Observations 578 226 352  262 316  
Table compares the ex-ante characteristics of 578 ventures below and above the funding cutoff across countries. Column 1 shows means and standard errors of ventures outcomes. Columns 2 
and 3 present information for deals in countries with VC to GDP Ratio above the median and deals in countries with below the median VC to GDP ratio. Column 4 tests for the equality of the 
means from columns 2 and 3 and presents the differences between the means. Columns 5 and 6 compare information for deals in countries where number of steps to open business is above the 
median to deals in countries where this number of below the median. Column 7 tests for the equality of the means from columns 5 and 6 and presents the differences between the means. *, ** 
and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Table 6 - Discontinuity and funding status 
 (0,1)Venture received funding from angel group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
      
(0,1)Venture is above the funding cutoff 0.303*** 0.269*** 0.252*** 0.255*** 0.183*** 
 (0.0382) (0.0367) (0.0375) (0.0376) (0.0466) 
      
Observations 578 578 568 568 307 
R-squared 0.109 0.251 0.288 0.293 0.368 
Angel group FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE No No No Yes Yes 
Venture level controls No No No No Yes 
Table presents results of linear regressions of venture’s funding status on a dummy variable that equals one if the venture is above the funding 
cutoff. Column 1 presents the basic specification and the following columns add control variables. Column 2 adds angel group fixed effects. 
Column 3 adds year fixed effects. Column 4 adds industry fixed effects and column 5 adds venture-level controls.  *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Robust standard errors are reported. 
 
Table 7 - Outcomes and funding status – Panel A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 (0,1)Venture is in 
operation or underwent 
a successful exit 
 
(0,1)Venture has a 
minimum of 1.5 years 
of operations since the 
financing event 
(0,1)Venture 
underwent IPO or 
acquisition 
 
Log(Employment) 
         
(0,1)Venture received funding from angel group 0.228*** 0.168** 0.139*** 0.017 0.173*** 0.008 0.486*** 0.402*** 
 (0.043) (0.065) (0.037) (0.045) (0.037) (0.029) (0.134) (0.156) 
         
Observations 568 307 568 307 568 307 307 185 
R-squared 0.220 0.258 0.273 0.367 0.254 0.062 0.322 0.497 
Angel group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Venture level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 
Table 7 - Outcomes and funding status – Panel B 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Patent count as of 
today 
(0,1) At least one of 
the founders is still 
with the venture 
(0,1)Venture received 
any subsequent financing 
(0,1)Venture received 
subsequent VC 
financing 
Total subsequent 
financing raised 
(USD, millions) 
           
(0,1)Venture received 
funding from angel group 
1.824 1.736 -0.014 0.095 0.157*** 0.234*** 0.052 0.103* 7.718 -0.999 
 (2.078) (1.072) (0.053) (0.072) (0.049) (0.073) (0.039) (0.054) (7.165) (6.703) 
           
Observations 568 307 343 196 568 307 568 307 107 45 
R-squared 0.118 0.871 0.164 0.144 0.197 0.269 0.178 0.311 0.239 0.987 
Angel group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Venture level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Table presents results of linear regressions of venture’s outcomes on a dummy variable that equals one if the venture was funded by the angel group. Panel A presents the results for the first four outcomes 
and Panel B presents the results for five additional outcomes. For each outcome two specifications were used – with and without venture level control variables.  *, ** and *** denote statistical significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Robust standard errors are reported. 
 
Table 8 - Outcomes and discontinuity - Panel A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 (0,1)Venture is in 
operation or underwent a 
successful exit 
 
(0,1)Venture has a 
minimum of 1.5 years 
of operations since the 
financing event 
(0,1)Venture underwent 
IPO or acquisition 
 
Log(Employment) 
         
(0,1)Venture is above the funding cutoff 0.181*** 0.194*** 0.105*** 0.069 0.161*** 0.087*** 0.392*** 0.430*** 
 (0.040) (0.054) (0.036) (0.045) (0.031) (0.030) (0.116) (0.132) 
         
Observations 568 307 568 307 568 307 307 185 
R-squared 0.215 0.279 0.269 0.372 0.260 0.105 0.315 0.509 
Angel group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Venture level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 
 
Table 8 - Outcomes and discontinuity – Panel B 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Patent count as of 
today 
(0,1) At least one of 
the founders is still 
with the venture 
(0,1)Venture received 
any subsequent financing 
(0,1)Venture received 
subsequent VC 
financing 
Total subsequent 
financing raised 
(USD, millions) 
           
(0,1)Venture is above the 
funding cutoff 
-1.564 -0.237 0.014 0.001 0.163*** 0.213*** 0.089*** 0.093** 4.913 1.719 
 (1.595) (0.793) (0.043) (0.057) (0.039) (0.050) (0.032) (0.038) (7.680) (4.294) 
           
Observations 568 307 343 196 568 307 568 307 107 45 
R-squared 0.118 0.869 0.164 0.135 0.206 0.287 0.187 0.316 0.236 0.987 
Angel group FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Venture level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Table presents results of linear regressions of venture’s outcomes on a dummy variable that equals one if the venture is above the funding cutoff. Panel A presents the results for the first four outcomes and 
Panel B presetns the results for five additional outcomes. For each outcome two specifications were used – with and without venture level control variables.  *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Robust standard errors are reported. 
Table 9 - Angel financing effect across countries – Steps to open business 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 (0,1)Venture is in 
operation or underwent 
a successful exit 
(0,1)Venture has a 
minimum of 1.5 years 
of operations since the 
financing event 
(0,1)Venture 
underwent IPO or 
acquisition 
(0,1)Venture received 
any subsequent 
financing 
(0,1)Venture received 
subsequent VC 
financing 
(0,1)Venture is 
above the funding 
cutoff 
0.198*** 0.199* 0.127*** 0.170* 0.174*** 0.255*** 0.189*** 0.124 0.109*** 0.092 
 (0.040) (0.103) (0.037) (0.100) (0.031) (0.088) (0.040) (0.119) (0.034) (0.091) 
Steps to open 
business 
-0.156*** -0.156*** -0.102*** -0.092** 0.025 0.044* -0.152*** -0.168*** -0.062** -0.066** 
 (0.033) (0.043) (0.030) (0.040) (0.021) (0.026) (0.034) (0.037) (0.025) (0.028) 
(0,1)Venture is 
above the funding 
cutoff * Steps to 
open business 
 -0.000  -0.025  -0.048  0.039  0.010 
  (0.061)  (0.058)  (0.046)  (0.062)  (0.047) 
           
Observations 562 562 562 562 562 562 562 562 562 562 
R-squared 0.127 0.127 0.143 0.143 0.223 0.225 0.127 0.127 0.073 0.073 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Venture level 
controls 
No No No No No No No No No No 
Table presents results of linear regressions of selected venture’s outcomes on a dummy variable that equals one if the venture is above the funding cutoff and on its interactions with a number of 
steps to open business. For each of five outcomes two specifications were used – with and without the interaction term.  *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. Robust standard errors are reported. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 9 - Angel financing effect across countries - VC to GDP Ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 (0,1)Venture is in 
operation or underwent a 
successful exit 
(0,1)Venture has a 
minimum of 1.5 years of 
operations since the 
financing event 
(0,1)Venture underwent 
IPO or acquisition 
(0,1)Venture received any 
subsequent financing 
(0,1)Venture received 
subsequent VC financing 
(0,1)Venture 
is above the 
funding cutoff 
0.203*** 0.172*** 0.133*** 0.038 0.173*** 0.050 0.190*** 0.236*** 0.108*** 0.129*** 
 (0.040) (0.060) (0.037) (0.053) (0.031) (0.042) (0.041) (0.059) (0.034) (0.048) 
VC to GDP 
Ratio 
-111.213** -128.998** -161.926*** -216.804*** 17.410 -54.299 130.840** 157.544*** 92.401** 104.898** 
 (56.165) (64.358) (52.177) (58.901) (42.594) (46.832) (52.741) (57.868) (38.531) (42.553) 
(0,1)Venture 
is above the 
funding cutoff 
* VC to GDP 
Ratio 
 41.328  127.527**  166.638***  -62.055  -29.042 
  (59.224)  (57.530)  (54.772)  (62.369)  (49.259) 
           
Observations 561 561 561 561 561 561 561 561 561 561 
R-squared 0.102 0.102 0.143 0.151 0.222 0.245 0.105 0.107 0.072 0.073 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Venture level 
controls 
No No No No No No No No No No 
Table presents results of linear regressions of selected venture’s outcomes on a dummy variable that equals one if the venture is above the funding cutoff and on its interactions with VC to GDP ratio. For each of 
five outcomes two specifications were used – with and without the interaction term.  *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Robust standard errors are reported. 
 
Table 10 - Firm's characteristics across countries – Panel A – Full Sample 
 Ventures in countries 
Venture’s characteristics with above the 
median number 
of steps to open 
business 
with below the 
median number 
of steps to open 
business 
Above 
vs. below 
with above the 
median VC to 
GDP Ratio 
with below the 
median VC to 
GDP Ratio 
Above 
vs. below 
Employment at the time of submission 11.472 8.671 2.802** 10.229 9.791 0.439 
 (22.051) (22.164) (1.202) (26.217) (19.760) (1.267) 
Management Team Size 3.156 3.601 -0.445*** 3.749 3.218 0.531*** 
 (1.481) (1.993) (0.093) (2.339) (1.410) (0.099) 
Financing sought (USD, thousands) 869.344 1,467.327 -597.983*** 1,881.531 842.838 1,038.692*** 
 (1,298.506) (3,723.438) (149.858) (4,608.198) (1,206.385) (157.524) 
Stage of development       
Initial idea 0.098 0.260 -0.162*** 0.255 0.152 0.103*** 
 (0.298) (0.439) (0.020) (0.436) (0.359) (0.022) 
Marketing and development 0.488 0.365 0.123*** 0.350 0.457 -0.107*** 
 (0.500) (0.482) (0.026) (0.477) (0.498) (0.028) 
Revenue generating 0.413 0.375 0.039 0.395 0.391 0.004 
 (0.493) (0.484) (0.026) (0.489) (0.488) (0.028) 
Industry       
Biopharma, cleantech and healthcare 0.094 0.177 -0.084*** 0.158 0.131 0.028 
 (0.292) (0.382) (0.017) (0.365) (0.337) (0.018) 
Computers, electronics and 
measurement 
0.086 0.194 -0.109*** 0.195 0.118 0.077*** 
 (0.280) (0.396) (0.017) (0.396) (0.323) (0.018) 
Financial, educational and professional 
services 
0.081 0.103 -0.022 0.128 0.073 0.056*** 
 (0.274) (0.304) (0.014) (0.335) (0.259) (0.015) 
Internet and e-commerce 0.293 0.098 0.195*** 0.092 0.238 -0.146*** 
 (0.455) (0.297) (0.019) (0.289) (0.426) (0.019) 
Other 0.327 0.344 -0.017 0.353 0.327 0.027 
 (0.470) (0.475) (0.023) (0.478) (0.469) (0.024) 
Technology, media and 
telecommunication 
0.119 0.083 0.036** 0.073 0.114 -0.041*** 
 (0.324) (0.276) (0.015) (0.260) (0.318) (0.015) 
Observations 724 958  648 1,034  
Panel A compares the ex-ante characteristics of 1,682 ventures across countries. Columns 1 and 2 compare information for deals in countries where number of steps to open business is above the median to 
deals in countries where this number of below the median. Column 3 tests for the equality of the means from columns 1 and 2 and presents the differences between the means Columns 4 and 5 present 
information for deals in countries with VC to GDP Ratio above the median and deals in countries with below the median VC to GDP ratio. Column 6 tests for the equality of the means from columns 4 and 
5 and presents the differences between the means. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Table 10 - Firm's characteristics across countries – Panel B – Border Sample 
 Ventures in countries 
Venture’s characteristics with above the 
median number 
of steps to open 
business 
with below the 
median number 
of steps to open 
business 
Above 
vs. below 
with above the 
median VC to 
GDP Ratio 
with below the 
median VC to 
GDP Ratio 
Above 
vs. below 
Management team size 3.028 4.064 -1.035*** 4.219 3.235 0.983*** 
 (1.513) (1.932) (0.158) (2.297) (1.449) (0.174) 
Employment at the time of submission 10.969 9.507 1.463 12.190 9.403 2.787* 
 (16.942) (15.361) (1.522) (18.971) (14.757) (1.652) 
Financing sought (USD,thousands) 767.389 1,010.752 -243.363 1,484.686 777.626 707.060*** 
 (1,212.922) (1,737.912) (157.426) (2,869.979) (1,133.076) (247.441) 
Stage of development       
Initial idea 0.071 0.235 -0.164*** 0.226 0.121 0.105*** 
 (0.258) (0.425) (0.033) (0.420) (0.327) (0.036) 
Marketing and development 0.458 0.342 0.116** 0.301 0.444 -0.143*** 
 (0.499) (0.475) (0.045) (0.460) (0.498) (0.049) 
Revenue generating 0.471 0.423 0.048 0.473 0.435 0.038 
 (0.500) (0.495) (0.046) (0.501) (0.496) (0.050) 
Industry       
Biopharma, cleantech and healthcare 0.130 0.237 -0.108*** 0.204 0.179 0.025 
 (0.337) (0.426) (0.032) (0.404) (0.384) (0.033) 
Computers, electronics and measurement 0.126 0.263 -0.137*** 0.257 0.165 0.092*** 
 (0.332) (0.441) (0.033) (0.438) (0.372) (0.034) 
Financial, educational and professional 
services 
0.168 0.114 0.054* 0.115 0.153 -0.038 
 (0.375) (0.318) (0.029) (0.320) (0.361) (0.029) 
Internet and e-commerce 0.244 0.057 0.187*** 0.040 0.207 -0.168*** 
 (0.430) (0.232) (0.028) (0.196) (0.406) (0.029) 
Other 0.191 0.209 -0.018 0.261 0.162 0.099*** 
 (0.394) (0.407) (0.034) (0.440) (0.369) (0.034) 
Technology, media and telecommunication 0.141 0.120 0.021 0.124 0.134 -0.010 
 (0.349) (0.326) (0.028) (0.330) (0.341) (0.029) 
Observations 262 316  226 352  
Panel B compares the ex-ante characteristics of the 578 ventures in the “border” sample across countries. Columns 1 and 2 present information for deals in countries where number of steps to open business is 
above the median vs deals in countries where this number of below the median. Column 3 tests for the equality of the means from columns 1 and 2 and presents the differences between the means. Columns 4 
and 5 present information for deals in countries with VC to GDP Ratio above the median and deals in countries with below the median VC to GDP ratio. Column 6 tests for the equality of the means from 
columns 4 and 5 and presents the differences between the means. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Table 11 - Deal composition across countries – Steps to open business – Panel A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Employment Management Team Size Financing sought (USD, 
thousands) 
(0,1)Venture received funding from 
angel group 
5.231** -0.107 0.365*** 1.297*** 107.023 -64.548 
 (2.362) (3.250) (0.124) (0.355) (241.683) (317.565) 
Steps to open business 3.226*** 2.728*** -0.288*** -0.196*** 31.688 13.657 
 (0.975) (1.028) (0.068) (0.071) (80.962) (84.548) 
(0,1)Venture received funding from 
angel group * Steps to open business 
 3.319  -0.571***  103.274 
  (2.421)  (0.202)  (182.810) 
       
Observations 1,311 1,311 1,386 1,386 1,390 1,390 
R-squared 0.034 0.035 0.226 0.231 0.018 0.018 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Table 11 - Deal composition across countries - Steps to open business – Panel B 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Stage of development 
 Initial idea Marketing and development Revenue generating 
(0,1)Venture received funding from 
angel group 
-0.107*** -0.155** -0.008 0.048 0.114*** 0.107 
 (0.025) (0.067) (0.036) (0.105) (0.036) (0.107) 
Steps to open business -0.071*** -0.075*** 0.058** 0.063** 0.012 0.012 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.025) (0.027) (0.023) (0.025) 
(0,1)Venture received funding from 
angel group *Steps to open business 
 0.030  -0.034  0.005 
  (0.037)  (0.062)  (0.063) 
       
Observations 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 
R-squared 0.083 0.083 0.028 0.028 0.059 0.059 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table reports linear regressions of firm’s characteristics on a dummy variable that equals one if the venture received funding and on its interaction term with a number of steps to open business. 
For each venture characteristic two specifications are used: with and without the interaction term. Panel A includes the results for employment, management team size and amount of financing 
sought and Panel B adds the results for venture’s stage of development.  *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Robust standard errors are 
reported. 
 
 Table 11 - Deal composition across countries - VC to GDP Ratio – Panel C 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Employment Management Team Size Financing sought (USD, 
thousands) 
(0,1)Venture received funding from 
angel group 
4.860** 7.400** 0.391*** 0.239 120.278 417.539 
 (2.340) (3.460) (0.112) (0.159) (239.927) (305.485) 
VC to GDP Ratio 3,161.679*** 3,885.230*** 1,703.820*** 1,658.818*** 484,127.729** 576,246.490*** 
 (1,069.719) (1,150.348) (114.683) (115.683) (188,758.046) (215,396.596) 
(0,1)Venture received funding from 
angel group *VC to GDP Ratio 
 -3,334.140  207.735  -406,564.684* 
  (2,061.899)  (192.589)  (220,837.326) 
       
Observations 1,311 1,311 1,386 1,386 1,390 1,390 
R-squared 0.030 0.032 0.334 0.335 0.021 0.023 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Table 11 - Deal composition across countries - VC to GDP – Panel D 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Stage of development 
 Initial idea Marketing and development Revenue generating 
       
(0,1)Venture received funding from 
angel group 
-0.096*** -0.114*** -0.014 -0.022 0.109*** 0.136** 
 (0.025) (0.038) (0.036) (0.054) (0.036) (0.054) 
VC to GDP Ratio -132.773*** -137.587*** 4.826 2.660 127.947*** 134.927*** 
 (28.746) (29.439) (37.883) (39.442) (35.763) (37.449) 
(0,1)Venture received funding from 
angel group *VC to GDP Ratio 
 25.176  11.329  -36.504 
  (23.350)  (53.896)  (53.951) 
       
Observations 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 1,356 
R-squared 0.087 0.088 0.024 0.024 0.067 0.067 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table reports linear regressions of firm’s characteristics on a dummy variable that equals one if the venture received funding and on its interaction term with VC to GDP ratio. For each venture 
characteristic two specifications are used: with and without the interaction term. Panel A includes the results for employment, management team size and amount of financing sought and Panel 
B adds the results for venture’s stage of development.  *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Robust standard errors are reported. 
